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BOOK REVIEW

Achieving Balance in International Copyright Law
The WIPO Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and The WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Commentary and Legal Analysis. By
Jorg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, 2002. Pp 581.
Reviewed by Jane C. Ginsburg*
In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted two
related treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty,' and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (the WIPO Treaties). Though now often referred to as the
"WIPO Internet Treaties," 3 the agreements emerged after five years of preparation,
only the last two of which focused on a "digital agenda." 4 These treaties, following
on the 1994 World Trade Organization TRIPs Accord, 5 have substantially
expanded, and somewhat harmonized, the role of international copyright and
neighboring rights norms in the international exchange of works of authorship and
related productions. When enactment of the WIPO Treaties with their late-arriving
digital agenda seemed imminent, several critics, primarily from the U.S., expressed
fears that the looming international instruments were too solicitous of the desires of
the copyright industries; the proposed treaties' perceived one-sidedness6 threatened
to stifle the growth of digital technologies, and/or to snuff out fair uses.
*
Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University
School of Law. Thanks for research assistance to Carolyn J. Casselman, Columbia Law School JD class
of 2003, and to Toby Headdon, Columbia Law School LLM class of 2003.
1. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65
(1997) [hereinafter WCTI.
2.

WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No.

105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
3.
See, e.g., MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET 414-15, 415 n.12
(2002).
4.
JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: THE WIPO COPYRIGHT
TREATY AND THE WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY: COMMENTARY AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 5 (2002).
5.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 3 1, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Accord].
6. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Nations Meet to Weigh Revision of Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 1996, at Al (explaining apprehensions of librarians and software developers); Denise Caruso, Global
Debate Over Treaties on Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at Dl (perception that principal
beneficiaries of treaties would be major US copyright industries); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Fierce
Creatures: Copyright Exemptions: Towards Extinction?, Keynote Address at IFLA/Imprimatur
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The treaties that the December 1996 diplomatic conference ultimately produced,
however, reassured some of the "digital agenda's" most vocal detractors. For
example, Professor Pamela Samuelson, who attended the diplomatic conference
and had anticipated a "Wipeout at WIPO,"' 7 subsequently wrote that the final text
retreated from the discussion draft's "maximalist" position, successfully balancing
copyright owner and user interests. 8 Professor Samuelson pointed in particular to
the preamble of the WCT, which "recogniz[es] the need to maintain a balance
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest..." 9 and approvingly
noted that the
copyright treaty that emerged from the diplomatic conference was a real success for
the United States in part because that treaty is actually more consistent with the letter
and spirit of U.S. copyright law than the digital agenda that [the head of the U.S.
delegation, then-Patent
and Trademarks] Commissioner Lehman initially sought to
10

promote in Geneva.

Drs. Jbrg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski have now published a treatise on
the WIPO Treaties. The book's extensive analysis of the treaties' articles and their
genesis makes it possible to evaluate the initial optimistic assessment of the

treaties' ability to advance the development of international copyright norms while
reconciling the sometimes conflicting interests of copyright owners, intermediate
entrepreneurs, and end-users.
The WIPO Treaties 1996 affords a diligent and detailed examination of the
WCT and WPPT. The treatise gives the background to the treaties, including
earlier drafts of the articles, as well as proposals that failed to pass in any form.
The treatise also presents substantial commentary on each article of the two
treaties. It concludes with a brief assessment comparing the WIPO Treaties with

Conference on Rights, Limitations and Exceptions: Striking a Proper Balance 7 (Oct. 30-31, 1997),
available at http://www.imprimatur.net/IMPFTP/fierce.pdf (discussing lobbyist influence on legislators
"all over the world [who] have greatly expanded the traditional domain of copyright and neighbouring
rights" and noting with relief the defeat, "only in the last minute," of the temporary reproduction right);
Thomas C. Vinje, All's Not Quiet on the Berne Front, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 585, 586 (1996)
(cautioning that proposed article 13, with respect to obligations concerning technological measures, is
"unbalanced and threatens not only the public domain and the copyright/author's right balance, but also
innovation and legitimate business behaviour"); Thomas C. Vinje, A Brave New World of Technical
Protection Systems: Will There Still Be Room For Copyright?, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 431, 436
(1996) (arguing that any proposal should strive to not only "provide clarity and fairness to device
manufacturers, but also not to upset the existing balance in the law by allowing rightholders to eliminate
copyright exceptions and to eviscerate the public domain through technical means").
7.
Pamela Samuelson, Address at Symposium on Intellectual Property Law in the International
Marketplace at the University of Virginia (Jan. 25, 1997).
8.
Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 409 (1997).
Accord Neil W. Netanel, The Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441 (1997). Contra Irene
Segal Ayers, The Future of Global Copyright Protection: Has Copyright Law Gone Too Far?, 62 U.
PITT. L. REv. 49, 70-73 (2002).
9.
WCT, supra note 1, pmbl.
10.
Samuelson, supra note 8, at 435. See also WCT, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing "the need
to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education,
research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention").
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their predecessor multilateral copyright agreements, the Berne and Rome
Conventions, and the TRIPs Accord. An appendix sets out the texts of the treaties
as initially proposed and as finally enacted.
The exhaustiveness of The WIPO Treaties 1996 makes it an ideal reference
work for anyone seeking to understand the text of these conventions and the
diplomatic negotiations that brought them about. The authors are well-recognized
European experts in copyright law. J6rg Reinbothe is Head of Unit, Copyright and
Related Rights, Internal Market Directorate-General of the European Commission;
Silke von Lewinski is the Head of the Department of International Law at the MaxPlanck Institut in Munich, and an adjunct professor at the Franklin Pierce Law
Center. In addition, Dr. von Lewinski has been a frequent visiting scholar and
lecturer at Columbia Law School, as well as a consultant on international copyright
matters to the European Commission and to WIPO. Thus, the authors bring to their
task both expertise in international copyright doctrine and direct experience
regarding the creation and implementation of international copyright norms.
Moreover, both participated as delegates to the 1996 diplomatic conference. This
melding of the theoretical and the practical is one of the hallmarks of their book, as
it combines expert exposition of the international copyright aspirations that
motivated the WIPO Treaties, with the more gritty realpolitik underlying their
actual enactment.
I do not propose in this review to summarize the entire contents of The WIPO
Treaties 1996. Rather, I will keep to the theme announced earlier: Does the indepth treatment of The WIPO Treaties 1996 bear out the initial assessment of the
overall balance of the treaties, as promulgated? As a result, I will examine the
authors' presentation and analysis of two particularly contentious features of the
treaties: the scope of the reproduction right, and the new obligation to prohibit the
circumvention of technological protection measures.
I. REPRODUCTION RIGHT
The 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention inserted for the first time an article
expressly recognizing the right of reproduction, and providing a general test for
exceptions to it.1 Prior Berne Convention texts apparently had assumed the
existence of a reproduction right, as they established a variety of specific
exceptions to it-for example, quotations, 12 uses for purposes of teaching, 13 and
news reporting. 14 Though the 1971 text's new article 9 set forth a general
11. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION 1886-1986 §§ 8.6-.12 (1987) (presenting and
analyzing the reproduction right set out in article 9, and explaining its drafting history).
12. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised
July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 28, 1979, art. 10(l), S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. A quotation exception has existed in some form in the Berne Convention since the
original 1886 text; the current article 10(l) derives from the 1948 Brussels text. See RICKETSON, supra
note 11, § 9.20.
13. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(2). The current text of article 10(2) was
introduced in the 1967 Stockholm revision. RICKETSON, supra note 11, § 9.27.
14. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. I0bis. The current text of article l Obis was introduced
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expression of the right to reproduce a literary or artistic work, it did not define the
term "reproduction."'15 In 1971, the answer to that question may have seemed
clear, as most copyright authorities would have envisioned only analog media, in
hard copy form. Copies made in a computer's random access memory (RAM) and
other temporary digital copies thus most likely did not receive foremost
consideration, 16 though the text of article 9, extending the right to reproduction "in
any manner or form," may have been broad enough to cover them. 17 In 1987,
Professor Sam Ricketson wrote that the question of whether the reproduction right
reached storage of works in the form of invisible electrical impulses was "one
respect in which the Berne Convention would benefit from clarification."' 18 By
1996, when digital copies-made not only for permanent retention, but also for
temporary viewing or listening-accounted for a good deal of the exploitation of
copyrighted works, this "clarification" seemed all the more urgent.
The Basic Proposal for the future WCT endeavored to supply the needed
clarity.1 9 Proposed article 7(1) provided:
The exclusive right accorded to authors of literary and artistic works in article 9(1) of
the Berne Convention of authorizing the reproduction of their works shall include
direct and indirect reproduction
of their works, whether permanent or temporary, in
2
any manner or form. 0
Standing alone, this proposal might have proved controversial enough. But, just
as the Berne Convention matched the article 9(1) reproduction right with a general
provision in article 9(2) setting out a framework for creating exceptions to that
right, 2' so the Basic Proposal offered a provision authorizing exceptions to the
now-clarified right to authorize temporary reproductions: article 7(2).22 This
provision brought home the breadth of the restated reproduction right. It stated:
Subject to the provisions of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, it shall be a matter
for legislation in Contracting Parties to limit the right of reproduction in cases where a
temporary reproduction has the sole purpose of making the work perceptible or where

in the 1948 Brussels revision. RICKETSON, supra note 11, § 9.34.
15. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 9(1).
16.

But see Report of the Executive Committee of the InternationalUnion for the Protection of

Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Union), 8 COPYRIGHT 14, 15 (1972) (noting that, according to
professor Eugen Ulmer, "[t]he provisions of the Berne Convention (Stockholm and Paris Acts), in that
they clearly protected works at the input stage, appeared... to provide a suitable basis for the regulation
at international level of problems arising from computer storage and retrieval of protected works").
17.

See, e.g., CLAUDE MASOUYV,

GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) § 9.2 (1978) (right covers all methods of
reproduction, including those yet to be discovered).
18.
RICKETSON, supra note 11, § 8.10.
Basic Proposalfor the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning
19.
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Consideredby the Diplomatic Conference, art. 7(1),

WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/diplconf/pdf/4dce.pdf
[hereinafter Basic Proposal].
20. Id.
21.
Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.
22. Basic Proposal,supra note 19, art. 7(2).
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the reproduction is of a transient or incidental nature, provided that such reproduction
takes place in the
course of use of the work that is authorized by the author or
23
permitted by law.
This provision pleased few and outraged many. As Drs. Reinbothe and von
Lewinski explain, some delegations believed the provision unnecessary, while
others contended it should be mandatory. 24
The exception would have been
unnecessary in light of the Basic Proposal'sgeneral provision on exceptions and
limitations to all exclusive rights. Presumably, if the temporary reproduction met
the criteria set out in proposed article 7(2), it would also pass the "three-step test"
framework for exceptions set out in proposed article 12.25 The greatest outcry
came from those favoring a mandatory exception, or indeed, the complete deletion
of all of proposed article 7.26
Proposed article 7(2), rather than setting out
reassuring limits on the reproduction right, in fact revealed its broad-reaching scope
by making unmistakably clear that the temporary digital copies to which proposed
article 7(1) extended the reproduction right included any transient copies made in
the course of transmitting the work over the intemet, whether or not the
transmission enjoyed neither the author's permission nor a legal privilege. 2 7 This
would have meant that internet service providers could have been vulnerable to
infringement claims.

Ultimately, the delegates deleted proposed article 7, and substituted an "agreed
statement" on the scope of the reproduction right, carried over from article 9(1) of

the 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention. 28 The agreed statement provides:
The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the
exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular
to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected
work in digital form in an electronic medium2 9 constitutes a reproduction within the
meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.

23.
Id.
24. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 41.
25. Basic Proposal,supra note 19, art. 12. The "three-step test" is derived from article 9(2) of the
Berne Convention's 1971 (Paris) text. See RICKETSON, supra note 11, § 9.5. The test was more
recently echoed in article 13 of the TRIPs Accord, supra note 5. The "three-step test" limits member
states' entitlement to derogate from exclusive rights, to "certain special cases that do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author." WCT, supra note 1, art. 13. Basic Proposalarticle 12 was adopted almost verbatim as WCT
article 10. Compare Basic Proposal,supra note 19, art. 7(2), with WCT, supra note 1, art. 10.
26. See, e.g., Tani Freedman, Global Copyright Treaties Slammed by US Lobby (Dec. 5, 1996), at
http://www.public-domain.org/wipo/dec96/dec96.html (quoting James Love, director of the Consumer
Project on Technology, who characterized conference participants as "basically incompetent" and
argued that "[n]o one that used the Internet or understood the Internet would propose strict rules making
copies of random access memory or temporary cache copies of documents a presumed infringement of
copyright").
27. Basic Proposal,supra note 19, art. 7(2).
28. WCT, supra note I, agreed statement concerning art. 1(4). Cf Berne Convention, supra note
12, art. 9(I).
29. WCT, supra note 1, agreed statement concerning art. 1(4).
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Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski propose an analysis of this statement that
reflects the views most traditional international copyright experts hold today,
especially in Europe-that the reproduction right reaches broadly to cover acts of
electronic storage and communication. 30 It is also an analysis that several
exponents of copyright law resist, particularly in the United States. 3 1 In this case,
the records of the 1996 diplomatic conference give the resisters some support: the
tortured history of this agreed statement indicates reluctance on the part of a
minority of delegates to endorse a characterization of the reproduction right as
reaching electronic storage. The agreed statement passed by fifty-one votes in
favor, five against, and thirty abstaining. 32 According to article 31 (2)(a) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 33 an agreed statement is not part of the
"context" in which a treaty should be interpreted, unless "all the parties" have
agreed to it. 34 As a result, it is not completely clear from the history and text of the

30.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 42-43. See, e.g., FICSOR, supra note 3, at 96102; Mihily Ficsor, The Spring 1997 Horace S. Manges Lecture-Copyrightfor the Digital Era: The
WIPO "Internet" Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 197, 204 (1997) (commenting that "[t]he fact
that the storage of works in electronic memories is an act of reproduction has been recognized-and has
never been questioned-for a long time"); PIERRE SIRINELLI, LAMY DROIT DES MtD1AS ET DE LA
COMMUNICATION para 121-24 (2002) (reviewing French caselaw and asserting that "French decisions
have long recognized ... the exclusive right to reproduce a work directly or indirectly, permanently or
provisionally, by any means and in any form" and that "the fleeting character of the reproduction [in a
computer's temporary memory] does not matter"). See also, Council Directive 2001/29 of 22 May 2001
on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,
art. 5(1), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Copyright Directive] (imposing mandatory exception from
reproduction right for certain transient and incidental acts of temporary reproduction; if these acts were
not otherwise understood to come within the scope of the reproduction right, no exception would have
been needed); 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2001) (providing exceptions for certain temporary copies made while
computer is in operation; were RAM copies not otherwise actionable reproductions, these exceptions
would not be needed); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 107-20 (2001), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmcastudy.html (reviewing the text of the U.S.
Copyright Act and the caselaw, and concluding that reproductions in RAM are "copies for copyright
purposes").
31.
See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 380-392. "The most honest thing that can be said about
the temporary copying of works in computer memory is that there is no international consensus on this
subject." Id at 392. See also Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights On the Internet,
22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1997) (criticizing both the Ninth Circuit decision in MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1982), and INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) (the "Nil White Paper"), for
failing to appropriately recognize that "[tlhe legislative history accompanying the 'fixation' language in
the 1976 Copyright Act strongly suggests that Congress did not consider such [RAM] copies to be
'fixed' "); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 42 (1994)
(arguing that "the better view of the law is that the act of reading a work into a computer's random
access memory is too transitory to create a reproduction within the meaning of section 106(1)"); Jaap H.
Spoor, The Copyright Approach to Copying on the Internet: (Over)stretching the Reproduction Right?,
in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 67 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996).
32.
2 WIPO, RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON CERTAIN COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS QUESTIONS, GENEVA 1996, at 628 (1999).
33.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(2)(a), S. EXEC. DOC. L, 921,at 20, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
34.
Id.
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WCT that international consensus has yet been achieved on the scope of the
35
reproduction right, particularly in the context of digital communications.
Nonetheless, for the authors of The WIPO Treaties 1996, the Berne Convention
already incorporated a "wide concept of reproduction" based on the concept of
"fixation"; a fixation need not be permanent, so long as it can be "perceived,
reproduced or otherwise communicated., 36
For these authors, the Berne
Convention's "abstract formulation" of the reproduction right is "future-proof,"
because it covers "any manner or form" of reproduction including those unknown
at the time of the treaty's drafting. 37 Consequently, temporary copies, including
those made in RAM, as well as in the course of communicating a work over a
digital network, come within the scope of the reproduction right. Drs. Reinbothe
and von Lewinski hasten to add that exceptions and limitations to the scope of the
right may be appropriate and desirable, especially in the digital environment, but
the starting point remains that, unless exempted, RAM and transient copies are
"reproductions." 38
Starting from the premise that the Berne Convention already embraces all kinds
of reproductions, including the temporary and the transient, Drs. Reinbothe and von
Lewinski find that the first sentence of the agreed statement simply states the
obvious: the reproduction right applies in the digital environment. 39 What may
make the text notable is its emphasis on exceptions to the reproduction right.4 ° For
Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski, the explicit confirmation of the availability of
reproduction right exceptions in the digital environment should lead member states
to re-evaluate existing limitations and exceptions, and may permit them to devise
new ones. 4 1 Unlike proposed article 7(2), which seemed very narrowly to confine
the realm of new exceptions to the newly-extended right, 42 the structure of the first
sentence of the agreed statement gives the exceptions as much weight as the
reaffirmation of the right. 43 This reading would tend to support the claim that,
however overbearing its beginnings, the WCT ended up reasonably balancing the
44
interests of copyright owners and users.

35.

For a fuller discussion of the interpretative difficulties the history of the article 1(4) agreed

statement creates, see SAM RiCKETSON, THE THREE-STEP TEST, DEEMED QUANTITIES, LIBRARIES AND
CLOSED ExCEPTIONs 49-50 (2002).

36.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 42-43. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) (defining
fixation in closely similar terms).
37.

REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 44.

38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 43-44.
WCT, supra note 1, agreed statement concerning art. 1(4).

41.

REINBOTHE & VON LEWtNSKI, supra note 4, at 44.

42. Basic Proposal, supra note 19, art. 7(2). The qualifier "seemed" is appropriate here, because
proposed art. 7(2) incorporated by reference Berne Convention 9(2), which sets out the general, "threestep test" for exceptions to the reproduction right. The creation of a special exception for volatile copies
made in transmission need not invite a negative inference as to the availability of other exceptions to the
reproduction right.
43. WCT, supra note 1, agreed statement concerning art. 1(4).
44. 1 acknowledge that this balance is different from the one Professor Samuelson perceives:
where Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski articulate a broad reproduction right offset by authorization to
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But the pursuit of balance does not always produce clarity; what the agreed
statement gains in even-handedness it may lose in felicity of articulation. The
second sentence of the agreed statement is a case in point. 45 In providing that "[i]t
is understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an electronic
medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Beme
46
Convention," the text scrupulously avoids detailing the meaning of "storage."
The term may imply permanence, but the medium does not. Drs. Reinbothe and
von Lewinski nonetheless claim that this text "states ... the obvious and reflects
traditional common ground.4 7 If "storage" means retention for some more than
transitory period of time, then use of the term would offer no departure from
common ground. If, however, the term was meant also to cover fleeting passage
through a digital network, then, despite the emphasis The WIPO Treaties 1996 puts
on the original broad understanding of the Berne Convention's reproduction right,
one may wonder at the selection of a term whose ordinary meaning implies more
lingering than just passing through. Moreover, if the term is to be understood in its
ordinary meaning, then one might question whether it also justifies a negative
inference: if the copy of the work is not "stored" because it is transient, does that
mean it is not a reproduction? This uncertainty suggests a more cynical reason for
the balance the WCT is credited with achieving: if the treaty is perceived as
according equal consideration to rightholders and users, 48 it may arrive at that
result more through incoherence than design. Each side sees what it wishes to see
in a text that permits more than one reading.
H. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES
The determination to create an international norm in the WCT requiring the
legal protection of technological protection measures furnished a second area of
contention. 49 The norm was an innovation: for the first time, an international
copyright treaty would address not only the substantive rights authors enjoy, but the
technological means they employ to secure those rights. 50 In effect, the treaty
instructs member states to supply a first, legal, layer of protection; the authors or
their successors in title then add a second, technological, layer of protection (should
they so choose); then the treaty imposes a third layer by directing member states to

create exceptions to the coverage of temporary (and other) copies, Professor Samuelson interprets the
history of failed article 7 and the text of the agreed statement as promoting balance by rejecting the
RAM copying doctrine. See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 435-46.
45.

WCT, supra note 1, agreed statement concerning art. 1(4).

46. Id.
47. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 44.
48. See, e.g., Julie S. Sheinblatt, The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 550
(1998) (both "maximalists" and "minimalists" claimed to have been the victors in the WIPO Treaty
process).
49. REINBOTHE & VON LEWlNSKI, supra note 4, at 135-36.
50. Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski note, however, that "[a]rticle 1707 NAFTA... provides for
a certain protection concerning program-decryption measures." Id. at 139 n.22.
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51
prohibit the neutralization of the technological locks that authors apply.
According to Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski, the drafters' and delegates'
attention focused not so much on whether this third layer was in principle necessary
or desirable, as on the precise content of the prohibition. 52 The final text differed
significantly from the Basic Proposal. The Basic Proposaloffered:

Contracting Parties shall make unlawful the importation, manufacture or distribution
of protection-defeating devices, or the offer or performance of any service having the
same effect, by any person knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that the
device or service will be used for, or in the course of, the exercise of rights provided
under this Treaty that is not authorized by the rightholder or the law.
Contracting Parties shall provide for appropriate and effective remedies against the
unlawful acts referred to in paragraph (1).
As used in this Article, "protection-defeating device" means any device, product or
component incorporated into a device or product, the primary purpose or effect of
which is to circumvent any process, treatment, mechanism or sstem that prevents or
inhibits any of the acts covered by the rights under this Treaty.
In its final form, article 11 stated, rather more succinctly:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used
by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the
Beme Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of54their works, which are not
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
Although the juxtaposition of these two texts permits several inferences about
the final text's meaning, The WIPO Treaties 1996 largely confines its commentary
to the final version. 55 I will first summarize some of the authors' conclusions, and
will then consider additional analyses that a comparison of the texts may prompt.
Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski examine each component of the final text; I will
focus on three: "adequate legal protection"; "the circumvention"; and "acts...
not ...

permitted by law."

56

51.
WCT, supra note 1,art. 11.
52.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 135-41. The authors state that there was
"widespread agreement" on the need for legal protections of technological measures, and point to
provisions already in place in several WCT member states' domestic laws, id at 140, such as the
European Union's 1991 Software Directive. Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 7(l)(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 25 (prohibiting the
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of 1992 Audio Home Recording Act prohibiting the distribution of devices and performance of services
whose primary purpose or effect is to circumvent the copy controls provided for in that legislation).
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With respect to the nature of the legal protection, The WIPO Treaties 1996
emphasizes the balance this term seeks to incorporate between the interests of
authors seeking strong protection in the digital environment, and hardware
manufacturers seeking to avoid imposition of "mandates" specifying protective
equipment. 57 The authors further contend that "adequate" legal protection must
also take account of appropriate exceptions and limitations on copyright; in other
58
words, "adequate" does not mean "maximally vigorous," much less "excessive."
The authors also perceive that the term covers both access controls and anti-copy
controls, as well as "preparatory acts," that is, distribution of devices enabling endusers to circumvent the technological protections. 59 They return to60 the latter
characterization in their analysis of the meaning of "the circumvention."
The text prohibiting "the circumvention" may appear directly to address only the
actual act of circumventing, rather than the provision of devices to allow others to
engage in that act.61 Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski, however, observe first that
end-user acts of circumvention conducted in private homes are difficult (and
undesirable) to police, and second, that the distribution of devices is not only more
easily controlled by copyright owners, but probably poses the greater risk of
economic harm to right holders. 62 As a result, were the "preparatory act" of device
distribution not covered by the requirement to prohibit
"the circumvention," then
63
the protection afforded would hardly be "adequate."
The authors return to the theme of balance in their treatment of the relationship
of technological measures to copyright exceptions. 64 The treaty language leaves
room for circumventions that enable acts "permitted by law." 65 Thus, it is clear
enough from the text that member states should not prohibit the direct act of
circumvention when this is accomplished in order to engage in an activity covered
by an applicable national law exception. But what about the provision of devices
of which users might avail themselves for privileged purposes? The problem, of
course, is that users might also employ the device for purposes not permitted by
local law. Moreover, the devices "by their very nature ...cannot be restricted to
particular uses." 66 This can mean that a member state prohibition on the circulation
of circumvention devices may frustrate lawful uses. On the other hand, nonprohibition may frustrate effective exercise of copyright. The authors advance two
reasons to favor a broad proscription of "preparatory acts" over legislation
restricting the prohibition to acts of circumvention that do not enable users to make
privileged uses. The authors point out that technological and market developments

57.

REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 143.

58.
59.
60.

Id. at 144.
Id.at 143-44.
Id.at 145.
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WCT, supra note 1,art. 1I.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 144.
Id.at 144-45.
Id.at 146.
WCT, supra note 1, art. 11.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 146.

63.
64.
65.
66.
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may make such legislation "premature," 67 though "obsolete" may be the better
characterization for legislation enacted to respond to situations that events may
rapidly overtake.
The authors also stress that the need for exceptions from the prohibition on
circumvention devices becomes more or less acute depending on the availability of
works in unprotected formats, digital or analog. 68 The authors credit the criticism
that current fears of digital lockup are "largely exaggerated. '69 They nonetheless
offer four criteria for appropriate limitations on the prohibition: member states
implementing the WCT should (1) prefer voluntary arrangements between
rightholders and the beneficiaries of copyright exceptions in lieu of legislated
limitations; (2) ensure that the exceptions the limitations seek to preserve are
"relevant and important" and conform to the general "three-step test" for copyright
exceptions; 70 (3) require that access to the work be lawful; and (4) "not permit
uncontrolled circumvention of technological measures. ' 7 1 The last criterion seems
to constrain a member state's authority to permit the general circulation of a
circumvention device; even if the device were used by some to give effect to a core
exception, such as the privilege to quote from a work in the course of research or
criticism, 72 and even if the user had obtained lawful access to the work (for
example, by purchasing a copy or borrowing it from a library), the general
availability of the device would "permit uncontrolled circumvention."
This
suggests that the authors would endorse legislation making circumvention devices
available to specified persons for specified purposes (for example, to university
73
librarians), but not to the public at large.
Drs. Reinbothe and von Lewinski appear satisfied that, despite the potential
tension between protecting technological measures, and preserving exceptions to
copyright, the WCT achieves an appropriate balance or, at least, that imbalance has
yet to be shown. 74 Further scrutiny of the final text, particularly in comparison with
the prior proposal, generally bears out that encouraging assessment, albeit for
reasons additional to those advanced by the authors.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The "three-step test" is set out at article 10 of the WCT, supra note 1, and is carried over from
Berne Convention, supra note 12, article 9(2), which instituted the test with regard to exceptions from
the reproduction right.
71.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 147.
72. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 10.
73. The Australian digital amendments endeavor to make this kind of distinction. The Digital
Agenda Act of 2000 specifically exempted from anti-circumvention legislation reproduction performed
for such purposes as: interpretation; copying by libraries on behalf of students, members of Parliament
and other libraries; copying of unpublished works in libraries; copying in service of the Commonwealth;
and recording solely for the purposes of broadcasting. These purposes are themselves subject to various
qualifying criteria. See Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act, 2000, § 98 (Austl.) (excepting
from prohibitions on circumvention instances in which "the circumvention device or ... service [is
used] for a permitted purpose" and defining such purposes by reference to the Copyright Act of 1968).
See also Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 47-51, 183 (Austl.).
74. REINBOTHE & VON LEWNSKi, supra note 4, at 141, 146.
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The Basic Proposalclearly targeted circumvention devices and services; it did
not require prohibiting the act of circumvention (other than in connection with a
service).75 It also defined the kinds of devices within the prohibition's scope to
cover devices whose primary purpose or effect was to circumvent a technological
76
measure that prevented "any of the acts covered by the rights under this Treaty."
This would have meant that devices whose incidental purpose or effect was to
permit circumvention would not have been subject to prohibition, though it is not
clear how large a universe of devices this category encompasses. More
importantly, the Basic Proposal's language did not appear to accommodate
copyright exceptions; at least it did not refer to acts not authorized by rightholders
but "permitted by law." 77 The final text seems more balanced
on this score, even if
78
the implementation of an accommodation remains uncertain.
Does the contrast between the Basic Proposal'sfocus on devices, and the final
version's omission of explicit regulation of devices suggest that the final version
should not be read to cover devices? The final version's use of the term "the
circumvention" is ambiguous, for even if it most obviously points to the act of
circumventing, 79 it could cover circumvention by any means, including the
provision of devices. If member states are instructed to provide adequate legal
protection and effective remedies against "the circumvention," then they should
endeavor to forestall that activity from occurring. As The WIPO Treaties 1996
emphasizes, the most effective way to achieve that objective is to suppress the
market for circumvention devices.80 Moreover, failure to suppress the market for
devices may result in inadequate protection for the technological measures.
Note that a reading of the prohibition to extend to "preparatory acts" leads to a
further question regarding the kinds of devices that should be prohibited. The text
of article 11 no longer defines the prohibition to apply to devices whose "primary
purpose or effect" is to circumvent.8 1 But should this definition be implicit?
Alternative characterizations of prohibitable devices range from those whose sole
purpose or effect is to circumvent, to those which are or can be used to circumvent
at all, regardless of whether or not circumvention was the device's primary purpose
or effect. The former characterization is probably too forgiving, as it could
exculpate even those devices primarily used in fact to circumvent so long as they
proclaimed, or achieved, some other purpose. Such a standard would not lead to
the "adequate" protection of technological measures. On the other hand, the latter
characterization is too strict, because it could sweep in even those devices whose
circumventing abilities are incidental and insignificant. That standard, while most
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BasicProposal,supra note 19, art. 13(1).
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Id. art. 13(3).
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Id.
78.
WCT, supra note 1, art. 11.
79.
See, e.g., Terese Foged, U.S. v. E.U. Anti-CircumventionLegislation: Preservingthe Public's
Privileges in the Digital Age?, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 525, 530 (2002) ("the WIPO Treaties

appear to concern only the direct act of circumvention of the technological protection measure itself").
80. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supranote 4, at 141.
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WCT, supra note 1, art. 11.
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solicitous of the technological measures, disregards the balance of interests the
WCT seeks to maintain between copyright owners and hardware and software
designers. The WCT thus may imply some upper and lower limits on the purpose
and effect of proscribed devices, but it leaves to member states the determination of
where, within the tolerable spectrum of characterizations, to draw the line between
devices to condemn and devices to allow.
Finally, neither the Basic Proposalnor the final version explicitly address what
kinds of technological measures are to be protected.82 Rightholders generally
employ two different types of measures, those governing access to the work, and
those permitting or disabling copying and/or further communication of the work.83
But the only measures whose protection the WCT requires are those "used by
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under [the WCT] or the
Berne Convention." 84 Is controlling access a "right" protected under the WCT or
the Berne Convention? If it is not, then arguably member states have no obligation
to protect technological measures protecting access. One argument to the contrary
derives from the WCT's text: access measures are used "in connection with" the
exercise of the reproduction and communication rights, as access is a prerequisite
to making reproductions or further communications of the work.85 Alternatively,
access in the digital context is a right protected under the WCT and the Berne
Convention, because in that context, a user cannot apprehend the work without
making at least a temporary copy in her computer's RAM. If this copy is a
"reproduction" within the meaning of Berne Convention article 9,86 perhaps
supplemented by WCT agreed statement 1(4),87 then controlling entry into RAM,
i.e., access, is a right protected under these treaties.
By the same token, article 8 of the WCT enlarges the scope of the right of
communication to the public to cover "the making [of a work] available to the
public ...in such a way that members of the public may access these works at a
place and at a time individually chosen by them." 88 While article 8 contemplates
the public's choice as to where and when to gain access to a work communicated to

82. Id; Basic Proposal, supra note 19, art. 13.
83. See generally Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, FairUse Infrastructurefor Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 47-49 (2001) (discussing rights management systems as conferring
"a degree of control over access to and use of copyrighted content"); Jeffrey P. Cunard, Technological
Protection of Copyrighted Works and Copyright Management Systems: A Brief Survey of the Landscape,
in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2001 ALAI CONGRESS 24, 28

(Jane C. Ginsburg & June M. Besek eds., 2001) (characterizing digital rights management systems into
two categories, namely access controls and use controls such as copying, distribution, performance and
display); Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of
Technology, Lanv and Commercial Licenses, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 198, 201 (2000) (describing
copy protection technologies as "measures that control access to content, such as encryption, and
measures that control the copying of content, such as SCMS or Macrovision").
84. WCT, supranote 1, art. 11;cf Basic Proposal,supra note 19, art. 13(3) (mandating protection
only for technological measures used to safeguard "acts covered by rights under this Treaty").
85. See. e.g., Foged, supra note 79, at 530.
86. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.
87. WCT, supranote 1,agreed statement concerning art. 1(4).
88. Id. art. 8.
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the public, 89 the determination to make access possible at all is the rightholder's.
One might therefore construe article 8 as also laying the groundwork for a right to
control access within the text of the WCT. As a result, WCT article 11 would
mandate protection of access-control measures because these protect a right under
the treaties. 90 If, by contrast, one interprets the Berne Convention and WCT as not
requiring coverage of RAM copies, and if one does not read article 8 as initiating
an access right, then member states need not protect access controls against
circumvention, at least if these controls are not used "in connection with" the
exercise of better-recognized Berne and WCT rights.
To the extent that protection of access controls gives rise to fears that the
"balance" of copyright has shifted unduly toward rightholders, 9 1 the possible
ambiguity as to the WCT's coverage of access controls would permit member
states to readjust the balance in favor of users by leaving access controls without an
additional layer of legal protection. That said, the more persuasive reading of
article 11 would reach access as well as copy controls, principally because a
reading exempting the former takes issue with the by now well-established (if far
from universally loved in secondary literature) 92 RAM copying doctrine in many
member states' positive law. 93 But one must also acknowledge that, by accident or
design, the WCT conveys enough ambiguity on that score that some member states
may enjoy more freedom to determine the kinds of controls they must protect than
The WIPO Treaties 1996 suggests.
IlI. CONCLUSION
Much current copyright debate, particularly over legal security for technological
protection measures, veers from the apocalyptic to the utopian. Exponents of the
former view trumpet the imminent arrival of the Four Horsemen of digital lockup:
disappearance of works in unprotected formats, poor selection of repertoire or
terms of use for protected works, high prices, and Big Brother monitoring of
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consumers by copyright owners. 94 By contrast, acolytes of the utopian view
anticipate a happy, frictionless world of perfect price discrimination in which
consumers will avail themselves of an ever-increasing repertoire of works at a vast
95
variety of levels of enjoyment of works at reasonable prices.
What is the role of the WIPO Treaties in heralding this perceived disastrous or
desirable end? Polemics aside, it is not clear where on this hellish to heavenly
continuum the WCT and WPPT will place international copyright. Drs. Reinbothe
and von Lewinski's survey would set the landscape rather closer to Cloud Nine
than to the Ninth Circle. If they are correct in their assessment that, overall, the
1996 Diplomatic Conference struck a proper balance between enhanced protection
in the digital environment on the one hand, and promotion of lawful unauthorized
uses, including in the digital environment, on the other, then the treaties would
have promulgated a successful multilateral framework for national copyright
legislation. Indeed, even if the "balance" that The WIPO Treaties 1996 discerns is
not the same as the one identified by other endorsers of the treaties,96 the different
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LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 129 (1999) (cautioning that

technological control "permits a much more fine-grained control over access to and use of protected
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("DRM") as "digital restrictions management" and warning that DRM can "prevent copying and
distribution of public domain works ...control private performances and displays of digital content...
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over users," and that "information suppliers set consumers' agenda by releasing particular informational
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calibrations that the treaties make possible contribute importantly to the legitimacy
(if not always the comprehensibility) of the new international norms.
On the other hand, the differing assessments of where the WIPO Treaties have
set the balance also result in differently implemented national laws. This means
that even if the international norm-makers got the balance right (whichever balance
that might be), there remains ample opportunity for national legislators to get it
"wrong" (depending on which "balance" one thought was the right one).

